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WHITHER FREE EXERCISE: EMPLOYMENT
DIVISION V. SMITH AND THE REBIRTH OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE?
PIERO A. TOZZI1
If court cases were movies, the United States Supreme
Court's 1990 decision in Employment Division v. Smith' would be
one where the director bucked central casting in choosing villains
and heroes. For in Smith, Justice Antonin Scalia, ostensible
champion to the so-called "religious right," morphs into Dick
Dastardly, and Justice Harry Blackmun, joined by Justices
William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall, wears the white hat.2
Think of casting Willem Dafoe as the good sergeant and Tom
Berenger as the bad sergeant in Oliver Stone's Platoon, if you
will.
From the perspective of religious and social conservatives,
the result of Smith was to severely constrict the ambit of
religious liberty jurisprudence under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution. In Smith, the Supreme Court
effectively overruled at least three decades of free exercise case
law by holding that devotees of an American Indian peyote cult
were subject to laws of general application, regardless of whether
t Piero A. Tozzi is the Executive Vice President and General Counsel of the
Catholic Family and Human Rights Institute and Director of its International
Organizations Law Group. This Article is adopted from presentations given to the
Guild of Catholic Lawyers on April 4, 2008, and the Society of Catholic Social
Scientists on October 24, 2008. The author would like to thank Stephen Braunlich,
an Alliance Defense Fund Blackstone Legal Fellowship Intern, for his research and
editorial assistance in the preparation of this Article.
' 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b), as recognized in Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
2 The artifice of a cinematic comparison does not originate with me; I heard
Richard Duncan of the University of Nebraska use it in a talk he gave a couple of
years ago and have (shamelessly) cribbed it.
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the offending conduct was part of a bona fide religious ritual.'
Yet the demise of federal free exercise of religion protection in
the wake of Smith has a silver lining: the revival of state
constitutional free exercise jurisprudence as a (potential) vehicle
for protecting religious freedom.
This Article examines the rediscovered protections afforded
to those whose public lives are inspired by conscientious
adherence to principles motivated by religion that may exist
under state constitutions. The Article then asks whether such
a rebirth is enough to protect religious free exercise from
encroachment by an increasingly hostile secular culture
unmoored from traditional notions of right and wrong.4
I. THE UPENDING OF TRADITIONAL FEDERAL FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
A. The Smith Decision and Laws of General Application
In Smith, the Supreme Court took up the case of two drug
counselors who were-ironically enough-fired from their work
at a private rehabilitation center because they ingested peyote as
part of a sacramental ceremony in the Native American Church.'
Consuming the sacramental hallucinogenic drug caused them
to fail a drug test. As a result, they were discharged on the
grounds of work-related misconduct, resulting in them being
denied unemployment benefits by the state of Oregon.6 In
upholding the denial, Justice Scalia's majority opinion for a
divided court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt
religious practitioners from adhering to laws of general
application.7
3 Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 ("[Tjhe [Free Exercise] Clause does not relieve an
individual of the obligation to comply with a law that incidentally forbids (or
requires) the performance of an act that his religious belief requires (or forbids) if
the law is not specifically directed to religious practice and is otherwise
constitutional as applied to those who engage in the specified act for nonreligious
reasons.").
4 There is, of course, no guarantee that protections will be stronger under a state
constitutional analysis. See Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts
Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of
Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 1047-48 (1994).
' Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 878-79.
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Among the precedent that Justice Scalia relied upon was
Reynolds v. United States,' an 1878 case that rejected the claim
that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally
applied to Mormons, whose then-religious beliefs approved of
polygamy.9 Smith's need to resurrect cases from the nineteenth
8 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) (holding that laws prohibiting plural marriage apply to
all Americans regardless of their religion, and therefore, do not target any specific
religion).
9 In trying to fathom why Justice Scalia would appear to rule so contrary to
type, it may very well be that circa 1990 he saw free exercise as a Trojan Horse,
which polygamists might use to breach the citadel, followed in the wake by
advocates of sodomy and a host of other causes espoused by post-modem
individualists. This would be consistent with concerns expressed in dissent thirteen
years later, in the Supreme Court case Lawrence v. Texas, striking down laws
criminalizing sodomy as violative of the Constitution.
The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the belief of its citizens that
certain forms of sexual behavior are "immoral and unacceptable,"--the
same interest furthered by criminal laws against fornication, bigamy,
adultery, adult incest, bestiality, and obscenity .... If, as the Court
asserts, the promotion of majoritarian sexual morality is not even a
legitimate state interest, none of the above-mentioned laws can survive
rational-basis review.
Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick,
478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986)). If this indeed was the fear that animated Justice Scalia in
Smith, the legal firewall did not hold, and the breach occurred not at the Free
Exercise Clause, but rather the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
See id. at 592-93; cf. Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise Is Dead, Long Live Free
Exercise: Smith, Lukumi, and the General Applicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 850, 853-54 (2001) ("This free-exercise-phobia that animates Scalia's
opinion in Smith has been described eloquently by Ira Lupu: Behind every free
exercise claim is a spectral march; grant this one.. . and you will be confronted with
an endless chain of exemption demands from religious deviants of every stripe.").
This line of argumentation by Justice Scalia in Lawrence, and similar comments by
former U.S. Senator Rick Santorum, generated hostile commentary. See,
e.g., Louis Michael Seidman, Out of Bounds, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1329, 1331 n.17,
1335 n.37 (2004) (criticizing Scalia and Santorum, respectively); Sean Loughlin,
Santorum Under Fire for Comments on Homosexuality, CNN.COM, Apr. 22, 2003,
http://www.cnn.com/2003/ALLPOLITICS/04122/santorum.gays/ ("'If the Supreme
Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within your home, then
you have the right to bigamy, you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to
incest, you have the right to adultery. You have the right to anything .. ' "). Yet in
the wake of Lawrence, restrictions on plural marriage and "same sex marriage" have
been challenged; for tactical reasons, supporters of the latter have made a
prudential judgment to "continue to distance same-sex marriage from plural
marriage to avoid relinquishing the movement's hard-earned cultural capital and
societal support." Jaime M. Gher, Polygamy and Same-sex Marriage-Allies or
Adversaries Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement, 14 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 559, 559 (2008); see also Joseph Bozzuti, The Constitutionality of Polygamy
Prohibitions after Lawrence v. Texas: Is Scalia a Punchline or a Prophet?, 43 CATH.
LAW. 409 (2004) (addressing polygamy); cf Steve Weatherbe, Marriage Redefined
Again?, NAT'L CATHOLIc REG., Feb. 15-21, 2009 (stating that "if same-sex 'marriage'
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century to reach this result was due to the radical shift in
twentieth-century free exercise jurisprudence as existed prior to
the Smith decision.1" Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's protests
to the contrary,1  Smith effectively overruled decades-old
precedent as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner 2 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 3  cases which held that governmental action that
substantially burdens a religious practice must be justified by a
compelling governmental interest.
Although the Court attempted to distinguish Yoder as
a "hybrid" case in which the Court protected free exercise
because the facts also implicated another fundamental
constitutional right-the right of parents to determine their
children's education' 4-the distinction has been widely viewed
with skepticism because Smith itself also implicated other
fundamental rights, namely freedom of speech and association. 15
is legal, then so is any conjugal relationship between consenting adults"). The
taboo of incest has been challenged based on Lawrence as well. See Michael
Lindenberger, Should Incest be Legal?, TIME, Apr. 5, 2007, http://www.time.com
time/nation/article/0,8599,1607322,00.html.
Plaintiffs have made the [Lawrence] decision the centerpiece of attempts to
defeat state bans on the sale of sex toys in Alabama, polygamy in Utah and
adoptions by gay couples in Florida. So far the challenges have been
unsuccessful. But plaintiffs are... even using Lawrence to challenge laws
against incest.
Id.
10 Giving Justice Scalia the benefit of the doubt, while Smith upheld laws of
general application, the Court would apply strict scrutiny to laws that specifically
target religious practices. In Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, the Court, three years later, would find for the plaintiffs because the record
in the case "compel[led] the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the
Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances." 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993).
" See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 ("The only decisions in which we have held that
the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to
religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but
the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections.").
12 374 U.S. 398, 410 (1963).
13 406 U.S. 205, 235-36 (1972).
14 In Yoder, a Wisconsin law requiring all children up to the age of sixteen to
attend public or private school was overturned when Amish parents successfully
demonstrated that their children's attendance in high school was contrary to their
religion and way of life, and so, the law violated their free exercise. Id. at 207-09.
15 As Justice Souter later wrote,
[I]f a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to
swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the
situation exemplified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights
are certainly implicated in the peyote ritual.
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring).
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It is worth noting that this "hybrid" claim has never been central
to another Supreme Court decision.16 Likewise, Sherbert, per
Justice Scalia, no longer stood for the proposition that the "state
is 'constitutionally compelled to carve out an exception-and to
provide benefits-for those whose unavailability is due to
their religious convictions.' ",17 Absent a compelling justification,
however, governments must give religious reasons for
exemptions the same deference they give secular reasons."8
But what is the practical effect of the Smith doctrine vis-A-
vis religious liberty? Although it is beyond the scope of this
Article to explore the distinction between the old and new
doctrines in depth, applying three different Prohibition-type laws
to the two approaches demonstrates how the Smith free exercise
doctrine is substantially weaker than its predecessor. Law One
is a generally applicable ban upon all consumption of alcohol
without exception; Law Two is a ban upon all public consumption
of alcohol but providing exemptions for restaurants and bars;
Law Three is a ban upon all consumption of alcohol for religious
worship.' 9 Under the pre-Smith doctrine, all three laws-lacking
an exemption for those who use alcohol in religious worship-
would be unconstitutional unless the state could meet strict
scrutiny. The most notable case where this would apply is a
Catholic Mass (or Orthodox Divine Liturgy), where the initiated
drink sacramental "wine" at communion-the substance of which
is the Blood of Christ, though its "accidental" properties are those
of wine.2" However, applying Smith's free exercise doctrine (as
16 This may be due in part to the passage of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b), and Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(a), which restored the pre-Smith free
exercise test as applied to the federal government and in land use and prison
contexts. As discussed below, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was struck
down in part by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
17 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1412 (1990) (quoting Sherbert, 374
U.S. at 420 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
18 See Duncan, supra note 9, at 862.
19 These three examples borrow from those provided by Professor Richard
Duncan. See id. at 860.
20 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 1374 (2d ed. 1997). Catholic
teaching is that although the physical properties (or "accident") of the bread and
wine remain, their substance has been changed (or transubstantiated) into the
actual body, blood, soul, and divinity of Jesus Christ. Id. St. Thomas Aquinas
explains that the retention of the physical properties is
2009]
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clarified in Lukumi) to the same law would permit Law One
to stand as it is-generally applicable and without exceptions.
Law Three would remain unconstitutional as it directly targets
religious worship. However, Law Two would only be struck if it
could be shown that the religious reasons for seeking an
exemption were treated with less respect than the secular
reasons for which restaurants and bars were given an exemption.
B. Reacting to Smith: Congress and Boerne v. Flores
Reacting to Smith and its implications for free exercise,
Congress, in 1993, passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA), which restored the pre-Smith test, but it was partially
struck down in City of Boerne v. Flores21 four years later. In
Boerne, the Court held that those portions of RFRA that
applied to the states were "beyond congressional authority" to
legislate,22 though it left RFRA intact as it applied to the federal
government.23
In her dissent, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor called the
Court to remember that free exercise of religion is not just a
question of what beliefs you hold in your heart, but also requires
the performance of certain acts central to worship, like partaking
of the Eucharist or ingesting peyote.24 Her dissent in Boerne
persuasively argues that "the Clause is best understood as an
affirmative guarantee of the right to participate in religious
practices and conduct without impermissible governmental
interference" and that "where a law substantially burdened
done by Divine providence. First of all, because it is not customary, but
horrible, for men to eat human flesh, and to drink blood. And therefore
Christ's flesh and blood are set before us to be partaken of under the
species of those things which are the more commonly used by men, namely,
bread and wine. Secondly, lest this sacrament might be derided by
unbelievers, if we were to eat our Lord under His own species. Thirdly, that
while we receive our Lord's body and blood invisibly, this may redound to
the merit of faith.
ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGIAE, pt. III, Q. 75, art. 5 (1st ed., Benziger
Bros. 1947) (1266-73).
21 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
22 Id. at 536.
23 See Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S.
418, 424 n.1 (2006). Here, an Amazonian tea drinking cult's worship was enhanced
with the aid of hallucinogenic tea. Id. at 423. The drugs in the tea were regulated by
the Controlled Substances Act, and the cult successfully sought a preliminary
injunction preventing the Act's application. Id.
24 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 544-45 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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religiously motivated conduct-regardless whether it was
specifically targeted at religion or applied generally"-the
government must meet the highest standard to justify the law.2"
Under this old regime, religious liberty occupied a preferred
constitutional position of a higher level of respect,26 just as the
Constitution unequivocally makes free speech and freedom from
race discrimination rights of a higher order than "ordinary
rights" that could be circumscribed by legislative action. While
this did not mean that a believer had an absolute right to engage
in religiously-motivated conduct, even liturgical conduct-one
can envision a devout, practicing Aztec's religious worship
needing to be circumscribed 27-the government nevertheless had
to show a compelling interest in limiting it.2" Moreover, it took a
broad view of religious exercise that included belief and practice.
This has implications far beyond religious worship as religion can
spill into life in many ways: motivating the pharmacist to not
dispense birth control, the doctor to not perform abortions, or the
campground administrator to not rent out a pavilion for "same
sex marriages" ("SSM") when their beliefs inform them that such
acts are wrong.29
25 Id. at 546.
26 Id. at 564-65.
27 On the summit he was received by six priests, whose long and matted
locks flowed disorderly over their sable robes, covered with hieroglyphic
scrolls of mystic import. They led him to the sacrificial stone, a huge block
of jasper, with its upper surface somewhat convex. On this the prisoner was
stretched. Five priests secured his head and his limbs; while the sixth, clad
in a scarlet mantle, emblematic of his bloody office, dexterously opened the
breast of the wretched victim with a sharp razor of itztli,-a volcanic
substance hard as flint,-and, inserting his hand in the wound, tore out the
palpitating heart. The minister of death, first holding this up towards the
sun, an object of worship throughout Anahuac, cast it at the feet of the
deity to whom the temple was devoted, while the multitudes below
prostrated themselves in humble adoration. The tragic story of this
prisoner was expounded by the priests as the type of human destiny, which,
brilliant in its commencement, too often closes in sorrow and disaster.
See William H. Prescott, History of the Conquest of Mexico (C. Harvey Gardiner ed.,
Univ. Chi. Press 1966).
2 See infra notes 46-51(discussing broad state constitutional religious liberty
provisions balanced against the need to protect public safety).
2 See discussion infra. Of course, a secular atheist may also conclude that
facilitating contraception, abortion, and homosexual unions violates an ethical code.
For example, the founder of the Ethical Culture movement, Felix Adler, found
abortion highly unethical. See SIDNEY HOOK, OUT OF STEP: AN UNQUIET LIFE IN
THE 20TH CENTURY 347 (Harper & Row 1987); see also Nat Hentoff, Pro-Choice
Bigots: A View From the Pro-Life Left, Nov. 30, 1992, http://groups.csail.mit.edu/
20091
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II. THE REBIRTH OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL FREE EXERCISE
ANALYSIS
Smith forced a useful reexamination by states and state
courts of their own constitutions and forced states to ask: if what
the Federal Constitution requires is a minimum, what liberties
and values do our own state constitutions-which are organic,
constitutive documents-protect? As New York's recently
retired, former Chief Judge Judith Kaye has noted, "where there
are material textual differences between the state constitution
and a corresponding provision of the Federal Constitution, there
is little difficulty concluding that something different may have
been intended."" Smith has forced state courts to turn to their
own constitutions and examine those differences in order to
protect free exercise. This is something to be welcomed, for
taking state constitutions seriously was a skill that had
atrophied. Previously, when state courts addressed free exercise
issues, they tended to view state constitutional provisions as an
afterthought, content just to ape the federal standard. 1
mac/users/rauch/nvp/consistent/hentoff pro-lifeleft.html (proclaiming himself a
"Jewish, atheist, civil libertarian, left-wing pro-lifer").
30 Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, The Forty-
First Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture Delivered Before the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (Feb. 26, 1987), reprinted in 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 399, 412
(1987). Former Chief Judge Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals has been an
influential proponent of interpreting state constitutions independently from that of
the federal and according them their proper due within our federalist system of
government. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, New York's Chief Judge Kaye: Her
Separate Opinions Bode Well for Renewed State Constitutionalism at the Court of
Appeals, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1163, 1166 (1994); see also Piero A. Tozzi & Lisa M.
Tankoos, New York: Steering a Course Between the Scylla of Judicial Activism and
the Charybdis of Wayward Legislating-But for How Long? 31-32 (Ams. United for
Life State Supreme Court Project, White Paper Series, 2007), available at
http://www.aul.org/xm-client/clientdocuments/sscp/NY.pdf (citing theme of the
"stand-alone authority of the New York state constitution" as a lodestar of the Chief
Judge's jurisprudence, but also discerning "a hierarchy of state constitutional liberty
principles" in her jurisprudence, with free exercise perhaps less cherished than
others).
A recent book that gives a thorough review of how the abortion issue plays
out under state constitutions-which will certainly increase in significance if Roe
were ever overturned-is PAUL BENJAMIN LINTON, ABORTION UNDER STATE
CONSTITUTIONS (2008).
"' See, e.g., Blount v. Dep't of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me.
1988) (holding that "the full range of protection afforded.., by the Maine
Constitution is also available under the United States Constitution"). Additionally,
the state free exercise claim is "premised on a contention that the Maine
Constitution, by the language of the text and the record of the framers' debates,
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To simplify matters, the texts of state constitution free
exercise clauses can be classified into two categories: those whose
free exercise clauses mimic, in substance, that of the Federal
Constitution and those that diverge. Among the latter, there
exists a distinction among those that follow the "New York
model," as amplified below, and those that follow other models,
which this Article shall not dwell on.2
A. Free Exercise Clauses Echoing the U.S. Constitution-The
Massachusetts Example
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts Constitution is a
typical example of those that, in substance, follow the U.S.
Constitution's Free Exercise Clause: It states that "[n]o law shall
be passed prohibiting the free exercise of religion. "1 3  Though
states may, like Massachusetts, follow the general text of the
Federal Constitution,34 they are free to interpret their clauses to
different results. Not long after the Smith decision, in the 1994
case Attorney General v. Desilets,5 the Massachusetts Supreme
provides more protection for religious practice and less protection for countervailing
public interests than does the United States Constitution. [This] cannot survive a
comparison of the two texts." Id.; see also Donahue v. Fair Emp. & Hous. Comm'n, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 39 (Ct. App. 1991) ("In analyzing a claim of the constitutional right
to the free exercise of religion, the analysis is generally similar under both federal
and state constitutional law."); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 341-42
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (applying a compelling interest test to both state and
federal free exercise provisions).
32 Some courts and commentators conflate the free exercise provisions of New
York and Pennsylvania. Compare Vermont State v. DeLaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 266
(Vt. 1990) (classifying Minnesota as having a "Pennsylvania" model free exercise
clause), with State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990) (Simonett, J.,
concurring) (tracing the provenance of Minnesota's free exercise clause back to New
York's). See also Levy, supra note 4, at 1036 & n. 146 (listing "Pennsylvania model"
states). This Article is not meant to be an exhaustive taxonomic survey of states
whose constitutions' free exercise clauses differ from the federal; what is important
to note is that states differ in the level of protection afforded by their respective
constitutions post-Smith.
Interestingly, the Republic of the Philippines, whose Constitution was shaped by its
American colonial history, adopted a hybrid federal-New York model. SALINGANG
BATAS NG PILIPINAS [Constitution] art. III, § 5 (Phil.) ("No law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.").
33 MASS. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
34 See ALA. CONST. art. I, § 4; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA CONST. art. I, § 3;
LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST. art. I, § 4.
3 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
2009]
JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 48:269
Court was forced to determine whether the free exercise right
under the state constitution was broader than under the
federal.36
In Desilets, two devout Catholic landlord brothers refused
to rent an apartment to unmarried cohabitants on the ground
that they could not, in good conscience, facilitate conduct that
their faith taught was immoral. 7 The rejected cohabitants
filed a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against
Discrimination, alleging that the brothers' conduct violated a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited a landlord from refusing
"to rent or lease . . . accommodations because of race, religious
creed, color, national origin, sex,.., age,... ancestry, or marital
status of such person or persons ....
The Attorney General prosecuted a case against the
brothers, alleging that the Commonwealth's interest in
eliminating all kinds of discrimination contained in the statute
overrode any purported religious justification.3 9 The court held
that the brothers' conduct was motivated by sincerely held
religious conviction, and thus, amounted to an exercise of
religion.4 ° Applying a Sherbertesque balancing test, the court
looked at whether the Commonwealth had asserted a
"sufficiently compelling" governmental interest to overcome the
believers' free exercise rights and stated that the "general
objective of eliminating discrimination of all kinds referred to in
the [statute] ... cannot alone provide a compelling State interest
that justifies the application of that section in disregard of the
defendants' right to free exercise of their religion."41 Noting that
marital status, unlike "sex, race, color, creed or national origin,"
is not a category enumerated under the Massachusetts
Constitution's equal protection clause, the court was "unwilling
to conclude that simple enactment of the prohibition against
discrimination based on marital status establishes that the State
has such a substantial interest in eliminating that form of
11 See id. at 235.
37 Id. at 234.
38 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(6) (2006) (emphasis added); see Desilets, 636
N.E.2d at 235.
31 See Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235.
40 Id. at 237.
41 Id. at 238.
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housing discrimination that" it outweighed defendants' free
exercise rights.42
For proponents of the free exercise of religion, Desilets gives
comfort that courts in states whose constitutional free exercise
language tracks that of the Federal Constitution will readily
interpret the same language in line with the traditional
understanding of free exercise.43 By retaining the applicability of
the old doctrine, albeit as applied to the state constitution,
advocates in states whose free exercise clause copies the federal
government may have a powerful tool to protect religious liberty.
But, as explained below, strict scrutiny is not what it used to
be. It remains to be seen how strong solicitude for religious
liberty in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts will remain in
light of the Massachusetts Supreme Court's decision in
Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,44 which brought SSM
to the state and fabricated a novel, "fundamental" right that may
indeed conflict with guarantees of religious exercise, which
predate the founding of the Republic.45
B. Free Exercise Clauses More Robust than the U.S.
Constitution-The New York Model
In contrast to Massachusetts' plain vanilla free exercise
clause, some states provide stronger free exercise protection
in the actual text of their constitutions. New York's Constitution,
as originally adopted in 1777, contained the essential elements of
its present-day free exercise clause: protection of profession and
worship limited only by the need to prevent acts of licentiousness
42 Id. at 239-40.
It is important to note, however, that the court did not find the state's interest
in preventing housing discrimination could never be sufficient to justify an
infringement on the free exercise of religion. See id. at 240-41 ("On the other hand,
we cannot say that it is certain that the Commonwealth could not prove in this case
that it has some specific compelling interest that justifies overriding the defendants'
interests .... There are factual circumstances that bear on the question. ... ").
Needless to say, other states may interpret similar provisions differently or adopt a
"lockstep" approach that disregards the importance of prior state constitutional
precedent, abdicating the duty to interpret the organic, constituting document of
their sovereign state to Justice Scalia and the Supreme Court majority circa 1990.
See Levy, supra note 4, at 1035 (discussing "lockstep" analysis in Tennessee, whose
state constitution's free exercise clause mirrors the federal).
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
" See id. at 948-49; Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-Sex Marriage
Threatens Religious Liberty, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 939, 942 (2007) ("The
movement for gay marriage is on a collision course with religious liberty.").
2009]
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or practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the state.46
It has been incorporated in whole47 or in part4" in seventeen
states.
The modern New York Constitution, in language more
robust and sweeping than that of the First Amendment, broadly
proclaims that religious liberty is of paramount importance:
The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and
worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed in this state to all humankind ... but the liberty of
conscience hereby secured shall not be so construed as to excuse
acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the
peace or safety of this state.
4 9
The very structure of this language directs that the free
exercise of religion-to be "forever" allowed-is superior to
ordinary legislation. This fundamental right may be overridden
only in those limited circumstances where "peace or safety" is
implicated, or where a licentious practice is garbed with religious
justification. Rather than restricting religious liberty, the
latter "peace or safety" clause implies that religious exercise is
exempt from all laws of general application, save those within
N.Y. CONST., art. XXXVIII (1777).
47 ARiZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4;
CONN. CONST. art. I, § 3; GA. CONST. art. I, § 1; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST.
art. I, § 3; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; MiSS. CONST. art. III, § 18; NEV. CONST. art. I,
§ 4; N.D. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; WYO.
CONST. art. I § 18.
48 FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3 (incorporating the limits of public morality, safety, and
peace); see also MD. CONST., Decl. of Rights, art. XXXVI; MO. CONST. art. III, § 5.
49 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3. New York, whose four metropolitan counties had
established Anglican churches until the 1777 constitution, had a strong and early
tradition of sectarian tolerance. See McConnell, supra note 17, at 1424; see also
Edward Hart, Clericus, Remonstrance of the Inhabitants of the Town of Flushing to
Governor Stuyvesant (Dec. 27, 1657), http://www.nyym.org/flushing/remons.html.
You have been pleased to send unto us a certain prohibition or command
that we should not receive or entertain any of those people called Quakers
because they are supposed to be, by some, seducers of the people .... [11f
any of these said persons come in love unto us, we cannot in conscience lay
violent hands upon them, but give them free egresse and regresse unto our
Town, and houses, as God shall persuade our consciences, for we are
bounde by the law of God and man to doe good unto all men and evil to noe
man. And this is according to the patent and charter of our Towne, given
unto us in the name of the States General, which we are not willing to
infringe, and violate, but shall houlde to our patent and shall remaine, your
humble subjects, the inhabitants of Vlishing.
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this narrow enumerated category.50 Courts must thus give
"religiously motivated conduct" an exemption from otherwise
generally applicable laws "up to the point such conduct
breache[s] pubic peace or safety."51 To hold otherwise reduces the
constitutional language to mere precatory wallpaper, gutted of
any substantive meaning.52
Minnesota, like New York, has a strongly worded free
exercise clause that would seem to offer, on its face, broader
protection of religious liberty than exists in the Federal
Constitution:
The right of every man to worship God according to the dictates
of his own conscience shall never be infringed ... nor shall any
control of or interference with the rights of conscience be
permitted ... but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall
not be so construed as to excuse acts of licentiousness or justify
practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state ....
Like Massachusetts, Minnesota was confronted with a free
exercise case very soon after Smith. In 1990, the Minnesota
"I See McConnell, supra note 17, at 1464.
51 See id. at 1462.
52 Justice O'Connor made this point in criticizing the Smith decision by
construing New York's free exercise clause and sister provisions from other states:
The language used in these state constitutional provisions and the
Northwest Ordinance strongly suggests that, around the time of the
drafting of the Bill of Rights, it was generally accepted that the right to
"free exercise" required, where possible, accommodation of religious practice.
If not-and if the Court was correct in Smith that generally applicable laws
are enforceable regardless of religious conscience-there would have been
no need for these documents to specify, as the New York Constitution did,
that the rights of conscience should not be "construed to excuse acts of
licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of
[the] State." Such a proviso would have been superfluous. Instead, these
documents make sense only if the right to free exercise was generally viewed
as generally superior to ordinary legislation, to be overridden only when
necessary to secure important government purposes.
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 554-55 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
For a recent law review article that seriously considers state constitutional
guarantees as a means for better understanding the federal, see George A. Mocsary,
Explaining Away the Obvious: The Infeasibility of Characterizing the Second
Amendment as a Non-Individual Right, 76 FORDHAM. L. REV. 2113, 2123-25, 2157
(2008).
53 MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16. This provision appears traceable to the New York
Constitution of 1777. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990)
(Simonett, J., concurring); see also David H.E. Becker, Note, Free Exercise of
Religion Under the New York Constitution, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1088, 1118-19
(1999).
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Supreme Court reconsidered its previous findings from the
pre-Smith case, State v. Hershberger54 (hereinafter Hershberger I)
in State v. Hershberger"5 (hereinafter Hershberger II). In
Hershberger I, the court had taken up the case of members of the
Old Order Amish religion who challenged a state law requiring
all "slow-moving vehicles"--including their horse drawn
buggies-to display a fluorescent orange triangle while on state
highways.56 The Amish plaintiffs contested that "the 'loud' colors
required and the 'worldly symbols' the triangular shape
represents" were in conflict with their religious faith." Notably,
not all members of the Old Order Amish took this position; some
accommodated the legal requirements." Because Hershberger I
was pre-Smith, upon finding that the statute violated existing
federal free exercise doctrine, the court never reached a
determination as to the applicability of Minnesota's free exercise
doctrine. 9 After Smith removed the federal protection which had
been applied, the court took the case back up in Hershberger H.
There, the court interpreted its free exercise clause-
analogous in substance to New York's-as "expressly limit[ing]
the governmental interests that may outweigh religious
liberty."" Basing its decision solely upon the Minnesota
Constitution, which "provides an independent and adequate state
constitutional basis on which to decide," the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that because a less restrictive alternative (a different
color of reflective tape) that would not burden the Amish
religious beliefs existed, the statute must give way to religious
belief.6 Thus, even though the government could show that
its interest in traffic safety was "compelling," it nevertheless had
to show more before it could "infringe upon religious freedoms
which this state has traditionally revered"-namely, that "public
safety cannot be achieved through reasonable alternative
means."
62
54 444 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. 1989), vacated by 495 U.S. 901 (1990).
5 462 N.W.2d at 395.
56 444 N.W.2d at 284.
57 Id.
5 Id.
5' Id. at 289.
60 Hershberger 11, 462 N.W.2d at 397.
' Id. at 396-99 (commenting that Minnesota's free exercise clause was
"distinctively stronger [in] character than [its] federal counterpart").
62 Id. at 398-99.
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Minnesota is not alone in its interpretation. Like the "Land
of 10,000 Lakes"-home to the original basketball Lakers63-
Washington's free exercise clause echoes New York's in that it
limits the privilege "as to [not] excuse acts of licentiousness or
justify practices inconsistent with the peace and safety of the
state."64 In First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City of Seattle,
the Supreme Court of Washington considered a challenge to
Seattle's designation of a church as a historic landmark, which
would require pre-approval of any external changes.65 Finding
for the plaintiffs, the state held that "the Washington State
Constitution extends broader rights to citizens than the federal
constitution" based on six grounds, including the text of the state
constitution, differences between that and the Federal
Constitution, state constitutional and common law history, and
differences in structure between the state and Federal
Constitution.66 Concluding that the Washington Constitution's
free exercise provision was stronger, the court held that a
compelling interest test was appropriate and that the city had
failed to meet this test.67
Though New York's Constitution (obviously) follows the New
York model, the Court of Appeals-the State's highest court-
would not avail itself of the opportunity to expound on its scope
post-Smith until 2006, as discussed in greater detail below.68
63 Why a Los Angeles-based team would keep the name "Lakers" is perplexing,
though the result may perhaps be no more incongruous than the name "Jazz" being
retained by a team following its move from New Orleans to Utah. Such mental
peregrinations, alas, wander beyond the scope of this Article.
64 WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11.
65 See First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 177-78 (Wash.
1992).
66 Id. at 185-86. The remaining grounds included pre-existing state law and
matters of particular state or local concern. Id.
67 Id. at 188-89.
8 The state constitution's free exercise provision was not before the court in
New York State Employment Relations Board v. Christ the King Regional High
School, 90 N.Y.2d 244, 247, 682 N.E.2d 960, 962, 660 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1997), where on
"First Amendment grounds, under the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses of
the United States Constitution, appellant [sought] an absolute, threshold exemption
from the operation of the New York State Labor Relations Act." Id. at 361 (emphasis
omitted).
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III. THE NEW YORK STATE OF MIND: A MUSHY MIDDLE GROUND
IN RELIGIOUS LIBERTY PROTECTION
Although the above may suggest that states will find in
their free exercise clauses protection for religious liberty, in a
post-Smith world, even strongly worded clauses may not be
interpreted to the fullest breadth suggested by their textual
language. New York is one such example, but to appreciate the
current state of free exercise jurisprudence, a historical glance
backward is helpful.
New York State constitutional free exercise jurisprudence
dates back (at least) to the early nineteenth century, though
it went into desuetude during much of the twentieth century
while the Federal Free Exercise Clause dominated the analysis.69
In the 1813 case People v. Philips," a Roman Catholic priest
arranged for a repentant burglar to return stolen goods to their
rightful owner, one James Keating, who proceeded to inform the
authorities of what had transpired.7' Subpoenaed to appear
before a grand jury, the priest refused to disclose the identity of
the thief because the seal of confessional prevented him from so
doing. 2 Unmoved, the district attorney pointed directly to the
text of the state constitution, which, he intoned:
has granted "profession and worship" to all denomination
'without discrimination or preference": but it has not granted
exemption from previous legal duties. It has expelled the
demon of persecution from our land: but it has not weakened
the arm of public justice. Its equal and steady impartiality has
soothed all the contending sects into the most harmonious
equality, but to none of them has it yielded any of the rights of a
well organized government.
Not so, said the Philips court, in an opinion drafted by DeWitt
Clinton, a virtuous man of broad cast of mind who variously
69 Incorporation of the bill of rights as binding upon states was a gradual
process. Certainly the federal Free Exercise Clause was deemed binding upon the
states by 1940, when the Supreme Court decided Cantwell v. State of Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
70 N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1813, available at http://www.churchstatelaw
.com/cases/peoplevphillips.asp. This case was not officially reported but was
abstracted in 1 W.L.J. 109 (1843).
71 See id.
72 See id.
73 Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free
Exercise of Religion, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1409, 1411 (1990); see also N.Y. CONST.
art. I, § 3.
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served as both mayor of New York City and governor of New
York State, in addition to his duties on the bench.74 The Court
ruled that the New York State Constitution-written in
gratitude "to Almighty God for our Freedom"75-required
deference to the principle of free exercise:
It is essential to the free exercise of religion, that its ordinances
should be administered-that its ceremonies as well as its
essentials should be protected .... To decide that the minister
shall promulgate what he receives in confession, is to declare
that there shall be no penance; and this very important
branch of the Roman catholic religion would thus be
annihilated .... Although we differ from the witness and his
brethren, in our religious creed, yet we have no reason to
question the purity of their motives, or to impeach their good
conduct as citizens. They are protected by the laws and
constitution of this country, in the full and free exercise of their
religion, and this court can never countenance or authorize the
application of insult to their faith, or of torture to their
consciences. 76
Though the state free exercise clause did not receive much
attention while expansive federal free exercise analysis was
ascendant, this deference did continue post-Sherbert. In Rivera
v. Smith,77 the New York Court of Appeals ruled on a case
involving a Muslim inmate claiming his free exercise rights were
violated when, contrary to his earnestly held beliefs that he
would sin if a member of the opposite sex touched him, a woman
officer pat frisked him.7' Although finding that the "nature of a
correctional facility... is such that inmates cannot be afforded
free exercise rights as broad as those enjoyed outside the prison
setting,''79 the court nevertheless applied a compelling interest
test in applying the state constitution." Neither did the Court of
74 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 83 (Grolier 1989).
75 N.Y. CONST. pmbl.
76 N.Y.C. Gen. Sess. N.Y. County 1813, available at http://www.churchstatelaw
.comlcases/peoplevphillips.asp. Despite the reference to the "laws and constitution of
this country," what was at issue was the New York Constitution's free exercise
clause. Id.
77 63 N.Y.2d 501, 506, 472 N.E. 2d 1015, 1017, 483 N.Y.S.2d 187, 189 (1984).
78 Id. at 506, 472 N.E. 2d at 1017, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 189.
71 Id. at 511, 472 N.E.2d at 1020, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 192.
'0 Id. at 512, 472 N.E.2d at 1020-21, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 193 (The court tested to
see "whether the impingement on ... [plaintiffs] religious convictions caused by a
routine pat frisk conducted by a woman officer is outweighed by a legitimate
20091
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Appeals take a narrow view of what constituted a religious
exercise. In Rochester Christian Church, Inc. v. New York Public
Service Commission, the court overturned a Public Service
Commission denial of statutory benefits to religious schools
because they taught secular subjects, and thus, did not operate
" 'exclusively' for religious purposes within the meaning of the
statute.""l Reinstating the benefit, the court held that a school
can be exclusively religious even when it teaches secular subjects
because "the teaching of religious beliefs is the paramount
objective and ... it pervades all subjects whether secular or
religious."82
This brief review of New York's free exercise jurisprudence
from Philips to Rivera would seem to suggest that New York's
free exercise clause encompasses a liberal-minded view of
religious profession and worship and would protect it up to the
point of the infringing upon peace and safety. Unfortunately, in
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio,8 such was
not the case. Although its dictum provides a firmer foundation
for free exercise than is offered by Smith, Serio fails to credit
sufficiently the burden placed on religious believers and
institutions by next-wave coercive legislation and lacks the
measured deference afforded religious beliefs in Philips, Rivera,
and Rochester Christian Church.
Serio was the first time the New York Court of Appeals
interpreted the state's free exercise clause after Smith. There,
the Woman's Health and Wellness Act of 2002 mandated that
any prescription drug coverage offered by employers include
contraceptive drugs or devices.8 4  Despite the Act's benign
sounding name, this contraception mandate violated the religious
tenets of certain religious organizations, most notably the
Catholic Church. 5 Though the statute conferred an exemption
institutional need or objective of the correctional facility," then found for the plaintiff
as there were less discriminatory alternatives available.).
81 Rochester Christian Church, Inc. v. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 55 N.Y.2d 196,
199, 433 N.E.2d 132, 133, 448 N.Y.S.2d 149, 150 (1982). Although the court did not
consider the state free exercise clause in its opinion, the definition of religion is
applicable to the state as a New York statute was being considered. See generally id.
82 Id. at 204, 433 N.E.2d at 135, 448 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
s 7 N.Y.3d 510, 859 N.E.2d 459, 825 N.Y.S.2d 653 (2006), cert. denied sub nom.
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Dinallo, 128 S. Ct. 97 (2007).
84 N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(l)(16), 4303(cc) (McKinney 2009).
85 The Catechism of the Catholic Church states, "'every action which, whether
in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the development of
WHITHER FREE EXERCISE
upon "religious employers," it defined the class so narrowly as to
apply to almost no bona fide church social arm. 6 This was not by
accident.
Advocates for religious liberty could initially take heart that
the court would not blindly follow Smith because under Chief
Judge Judith Kaye, the court has been cognizant that where "the
Supreme Court has changed course and diluted constitutional
principles," the Court of Appeals has the "responsibility to
support the State Constitution when [it] examine[s] whether [it]
should follow along as a matter of State law."" This augured
well for advocates of religious liberty, as the New York
Constitution seemed to limit free exercise only by a governmental
interest universally acknowledged as compelling since the
founding of the constitution: maintaining public peace or safety
and preventing licentiousness. Access to contraceptives is a
relatively new societal "good," acceptance of which is not
universal. Indeed, well into the 1960s and 1970s, a number of
states had laws restricting the distribution of contraceptives.8 9
In New York specifically, contraception was once recognized as
promoting licentiousness, and thus, endangering the public
safety.9° Today, mores (apparently) have changed, but a mere
moral change did not necessarily alter the public peace and
safety or allow one side in the culture wars to point to a new-
found interest, label it compelling, and thus, coerce a dissenting
minority into violating conscience or creed despite a strongly
worded free exercise clause.
The New York contraception mandate legislation was
modeled after a California statute that required certain group
its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as means, to render
procreation impossible' is intrinsically evil." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH,
supra note 20, 2370.
86 The most substantial narrowing factor in the "religious employer" definition
was the prong that required a "religious employer" to serve primarily followers of the
same faith-in other words, a Catholic social service agency that served the poor
regardless of their faith background would not be deemed "Catholic" under this
definition. N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 3221(l)(16)(A)(1)(c), 4303(cc)(1)(A)(iii).
"7 See infra notes 91-92 and accompanying text.
8' People v. Scott, 79 N.Y.2d 474, 504, 593 N.E.2d 1328, 1347, 583 N.Y.S.2d 920,
939 (1992) (Kaye, J., concurring).
89 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965); see also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 440 (1972) (Massachusetts).
90 See Foy Prods., Ltd. v. Graves, 253 A.D. 475, 480, 3 N.Y.S.2d 573, 577 (3d
Dep't 1938) (an "immoral and reprehensible" practice), affd, 278 N.Y. 498, 15 N.E.2d
435 (1938).
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policies offering prescription coverage to include contraceptives.
Though the New York legislative history is fairly plain vanilla,9'
a reading of the California legislative history indicates that it
was designed to target Catholic institutions through an
inordinately narrow definition of "religious employer" as one who,
inter alia, primarily serves people of the same religious beliefs.92
Thus, employers such as Catholic Charities or the Carmelite
Sisters of the Aged and Infirm, which serve the needy regardless
of their religious affiliation,93 are not to be considered "religious,"
and must provide contraceptives to their employees despite
the consistent teaching of the Catholic Church that the use
91 In New York, the legislation had previously been blocked by the state senate,
then controlled by Republicans. However, the party's Senate leader changed
direction in an attempt to win a special election and retain a liberal Manhattan seat
whose voters supported the contraception mandate. The tactic failed. Tom Robbins,
East Side Attack, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 29, 2002, http://www.villagevoice.comI
2002-10-29/news/east-side-attack/.
92 The legislative record in California showed that ninety percent of Californians
already had contraceptive coverage and that the remaining deficit was a "Catholic
gap." Piero A. Tozzi, When Conscience Clashes with State Law & Policy: Catholic
Institutions: A Response to Susan Stabile, 46 J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUD. 161, 164
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, Kathy Kneer, CEO of the
Planned Parenthood Federation of California, testified that the bill intended to close
the gap by leaving out a broad religious exemption and the chief Senate sponsor
admitted that a narrow exemption was needed "so as not to exempt various religious
institutions." Id. at 165 (internal quotation marks omitted). Finally, background
information submitted to the State Insurance Committee in support of the bill
referenced Catholic employers, hospitals, and social service agencies, and the
legislation was built on model legislation that was crafted to protect as few Catholic
institutions as possible. See id. at 164-65.
The California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the California
contraception mandate, despite an impassioned dissent from former Justice Janet
Robert Brown. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d
67, 73-74, 98 (Cal. 2004) (Brown. J., dissenting). The U.S. Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. California, 543 U.S. 816 (2004).
Query, whether in its denial of certiorari, the Supreme Court gave due consideration
to the grounds outlined in Lukumi for reviewing legislation that might be targeting
an unpopular religion under the guise of a statute of general application.
93 See Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts To Define Religion: The Ramifications of
Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to Religious
Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 741, 757 (2005).
Jesus did not teach his followers to provide care only for those who have
accepted his teachings. The mission of Christ's followers is to feed all who
are hungry and care for all those who are in need. Thus, the fact that
Catholic organizations serve members of other faiths as well as their own is
part of their calling.
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of contraceptives is intrinsically evil. 4 Indeed, more morally
problematic than contraceptives qua contraceptives, certain
contraceptives like the intrauterine device or "the pill" may
function as abortifacients.95
Recognizing the state constitutional free exercise argument
to be the plaintiffs' strongest 9 and holding New York's free
exercise protections to be broader than the federal protection, the
court nevertheless declined to apply strict scrutiny, opting for a
lower "substantial deference" standard that required religious
adherents claiming an exemption from a statute to show that the
legislation creates an "unreasonable interference" with religious
freedom.97 In so doing, the court credited the sincerity of the
plaintiffs' religious-based belief that contraception was immoral
but noted that the conscience-crisis claim was overstated: As the
legislation affected only employers who provided prescription
drug coverage, a conscientious objector could sidestep the issue
by simply not providing prescription drugs to its employees. 98
Even accepting the argument that religious-affiliated employers
were morally obligated to provide employees with prescription
drug coverage as part of a system of just wages and benefits, the
court did not see the contraception mandate as an unreasonable
interference as "it is surely not impossible, though it may be
expensive or difficult, to compensate employees adequately
94 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 20, 2370; see also
JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO 32 (1981) (noting that
when couples use contraception they separate the unitive and procreative meanings
of sexuality and their sexual communion; they "degrade human sexuality-and with
it themselves and their married partner-by altering its value of 'total' self-giving").
"Thus, the innate language that expresses the total reciprocal self-giving of husband
and wife is overlaid, through contraception, by an objectively contradictory
language, namely, that of not giving oneself totally to the other." Id.; PAUL VI,
ENCYCLICAL LETTER HUMANAE VITAE 14 (1968) ("[The Church is obliged to
condemn] direct sterilization, whether of the man or of the woman, whether
permanent or temporary. Similarly excluded is any action which either before, at the
moment of, or after sexual intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent
procreation ..... ) (footnote call number omitted); PIUS XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER
CASTI CONNUBi 56 (1930) ("[Any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such
a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is
an offense against the law of God and of nature...
9 Stabile, supra note 93, at 752-53.
Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510, 521,
859 N.E.2d 459, 463, 825 N.Y.S.2d 653, 657 (2006), cert. denied sub nom. Catholic
Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Dinallo, 128 S. Ct. 97 (2007).
17 Id. at 525. 859 N.E.2d at 466, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
" Id. at 527, 859 N.E.2d at 468, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
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without including prescription drugs in their group health care
policies." 99 This reasoning, however, marginalizes the religious
believer, preventing full participation in the activities of the
public square.
Despite the above, the Court of Appeals in Serio is more
solicitous of religious liberty than the U.S. Supreme Court. In
dicta, the Court of Appeals indicated that certain potential
legislation, such as one which would threaten the seal of the
confessional (considered recently by the New Hampshire, °°
Kentucky, 1 1 Nevada,0 2 and Maryland' legislatures), would be
unreasonable and violate religious adherents' free exercise
rights.' 4 This is heartening and provides a theoretical firewall, a
point at which the court would step in to protect religious
freedom. Yet for the various groups opposed to the Women's
Health and Wellness Act, it falls short of the ideal.
Not all states opt to protect free exercise of religion to this
extent. Approaches taken in other states have included applying
the Smith test to state free exercise clauses or treating "the
Federal Constitution as the primary protector of rights and the
state constitution as the secondary protector."'0 ° Indeed, even if
New York had adopted the Sherbert test, Catholic Charities of
Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court10 6 suggests that the result
could have been the same, for there, the Supreme Court of
California considered the same legislative exemption that served
as a model for New York's contraception mandate. 10 7 Applying
(ostensibly) the Sherbert test to the California constitution, 0 8
with its New York-type free exercise clause, 10 9 the court found
against the various petitioners for religious freedom. 110 The court
reached this conclusion by discounting Catholic Charities'
assertion that Catholicism's teaching on just wages required
99 Id.
100 H.B. 1127, 159th Gen. Court, 2006 Sess. (N.H. 2006).
101 H.B. 58, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2003).
102 S.B. 223, 2003 Leg., 72nd Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2003).
103 H.B. 823, 2003 Gen. Assem., 417th Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003); see also S.B. 412,
2003 Gen. Assem., 417th Reg. Sess. (Md. 2003).
104 Serio, 7 N.Y.3d at 527, 859 N.E.2d at 467, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
105 Becker, supra note 53, at 1115.
106 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
107 Id. at 74 n.3.
108 Id. at 91.
109 CAL. GEN. LAWS ch. 151(B), § 4 (2006).
110 Superior Court, 85 P.3d at 94.
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prescription drug coverage, 1 ' elevating contraceptive coverage to
a compelling state interest 1 2 and finding that there was no less
restrictive alternative."' Thus, while reaching the same end
result as Serio, California's means of getting there was worse, as
it continued the pre-Smith strict scrutiny that was neither strict
nor scrutinizing.
IV. GOD'S SERVANT FIRST: FREE EXERCISE IN AN AGE OF
(IL)LIBERAL INTOLERANCE
Though some may consider it unduly alarmist, it seems
that we are living in a time when the right of conscience,
including that of conscientious Catholics, and the autonomy of
religious institutions, is under siege. Just as in the days of
DeWitt Clinton, a type of anti-Catholicism roams the land-but
it is not one emerging from the fever swamps of fundamentalism.
Rather, contemporary hostility toward the Church-and any
other institution that upholds traditional mores and standards-
springs from the bosom of progressive, secular liberalism.
Liberal theory views all preferences and the satisfaction of
such preferences, as equally "good," as all "standards" are
relative and personal. Therefore, non-liberal institutions and
standards, with their adherence to notions of objective right and
wrong, are oppressive, as they conflict with and restrain the
autonomous individual's choices." 4 Hence, such opposition must
be suppressed, and the liberal state so enlisted becomes
intolerant, seeking to force mediating institutions, like churches
"I Id. at 92 n.19 (stating that the petitioner could simply "avoid all conflict with
its beliefs by declining coverage for prescription drugs ... while offering its
employees a raise to offset the reduced benefits" and dismissing that such a plan
may be so expensive as to be a burden).
112 Id. at 92. Disingenuously, the California court stated that employers are
engaged in gender discrimination when they deny contraceptive drug coverage to
both men and women because women purchase more prescription contraceptives. Id.
at 74. Non-discrimination is no longer an issue of equal treatment, but equal
results-in this case health care costs.
" Id. at 93-94. This point implies that the legislation's narrow definition of
religious employer was meant to target those whose religious objections prevented
the gap from closing. Therefore, because the legislation targeted some religious
believers and institutions but not others, it ought to have been held unconstitutional
as burdening free exercise.
114 See generally JAMES KALB, THE TYRANNY OF LIBERALISM: UNDERSTANDING
AND OVERCOMING ADMINISTERED FREEDOM, INQUISITORIAL TOLERANCE, AND
EQUALITY BY COMMAND (2008).
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and even families,'15 out of the public square." 6 Of course, as the
public square becomes denuded, nothing stands between the
individual and the state, and the state, which grants positive
rights, can also take away rights, all in the name of its logic
of "tolerance" and equality.1 7  Modern liberalism becomes
totalitarian in its conceits. 18
115 Consider, for example, opposition to laws requiring parental consent before
minors may obtain an abortion. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood, 546 U.S. 320
(2006).
11 Liberals view themselves as idealistic and progressive, but such a self-
image conceals dangers even if it is not wholly illusory. It leads liberals to
ignore considerations like human nature and fundamental social and
religious traditions, which have normally been treated as limits on reform.
Freedom and equality are abstract, open-ended, and ever-ramifying goals
that can be taken to extremes. Liberals tend to view these goals as a simple
matter of justice and rationality that prudential considerations may
sometimes delay but no principle can legitimately override. In the absence
of definite limiting principles, liberal demands become more and more far-
reaching and the means used to advance them ever more comprehensive,
detailed, and intrusive.
KALB, supra note 114. While an extended discourse on liberal theory is beyond the
scope of this inquiry, its general contours can be discerned in works like JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (2d ed. 2005) and JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE AS
FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (2d. ed. 2001).
117 See generally RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE:
RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1986) and WILLIAM A. DONOHUE,
TWILIGHT OF LIBERTY: THE LEGACY OF THE ACLU (1994) for an explication of this
theme.
Those who lack utility, such as the inconvenient unborn child and the burdensome
infirm and elderly, are excluded from liberal society, and their rights and those of
their defenders-most emphatically, the (Catholic) Church-are "legitimately"
subject to reduction and even elimination. Perhaps the most encapsulated exchange
by the American judiciary on the issue of where rights derive-whether they are
objective, inherent and grounded in nature, or granted at the relativistic whim of the
liberal state-is found in the dueling majority and dissenting opinions in Byrn v.
New York City Health & Hospitals Corp., a pre-Roe New York Court of Appeals
abortion decision. 31 N.Y.2d 194, 286 N.E.2d 887, 335 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1972). There,
Judge Charles D. Breitel held for the majority that "[wiether the law should accord
legal personality is a policy question which in most instances devolves on the
Legislature," and Judge Adrian P. Burke defended the notion that "human beings
are not merely creatures of the State, and by reason of that fact, our laws should
protect the unborn from those who would take his life for purposes of comfort,
convenience, property or peace of mind rather than sanction his demise." Id. at 205,
286 N.E.2d at 892, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
116 See Robert John Araujo, Conscience, Totalitarianism, and the Positivist
Mind, 77 MISS. L.J. 571, 617 (2007); Jakob Cornides, Human Rights Pitted Against
Man, 12 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 107 (2008). For a philosophical inquiry into whether a
purely secular-based notion of human rights can survive without a theistic
underpinning for the concept of human dignity, see NICHOLAS WOLTERSTORFF,
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This conflict is most pronounced in the area of sexual mores
and reproduction, and it is here where threats to free exercise
and conscience are already upon us. Contraception mandate
legislation-the model for which was clearly designed to target
the Catholic Church-is certainly one threat. Future dangers
posed to free exercise loom particularly large in two areas:
that related to healthcare and "reproductive rights" (including
contraception) and that related to traditional marriage, pitted
against an expanding notion of homosexual rights.
A. Free Exercise and Health Care
The first threat to the free exercise of religion has an eerie
echo of Serio in its ring; it mandates that hospitals provide
"morning after" pills like Barr Pharmaceutical's Plan B that can
act as abortifacients to rape victims upon request without first
administering an ovulation test."9 For Catholics, the most direct
JUSTICE: RIGHTS AND WRONGS (2008) (the human rights project likely unsustainable
without notion of a transcendent Deity in whose image man is created).
I" Plan B is the trade name for Levonorgestrel, a high-hormone dose,
progesterone-only birth control pill; another marketed "emergency contraceptive" is
Preven, which uses a combination of the hormones progesterone and estrogen.
According to the Food and Drug Administration (and Barr Pharmaceuticals)
"emergency contraception" is believed to work by either (i) preventing ovulation, (ii)
preventing fertilization (by inhibiting the sperm), or (iii) preventing the fertilized
egg from attaching to the womb by altering the endometrium-in other words,
preventing implantation and effectively expelling the fertilized ovum. See Food &
Drug Administration, FDA's Decision Regarding Plan B: Questions and Answers
(May 7, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/druglinfopage/planB/planBQandA.htm ("If
fertilization does occur, Plan B may prevent a fertilized egg from attaching to the
womb (implantation).") (updated Aug. 24, 2006); Barr Pharmaceutical, How Plan B
Works, http://www.go2planb.com/plan-b-prescribers/how-plan-b-works.aspx (last
visited Aug. 3, 2009) (explaining that Plan B is believed to work by "[a]ltering
the endometrium, which may inhibit implantation."); see also Chris Kahlenborn
et al., Postfertilization Effects of Hormonal Emergency Contraception, 36 ANNALS
OF PHARMACOTHERAPY 465 (2002), available at http://www.polycarp.org/
postfertilizationpolycarpl.htm. It is this latter function that is problematic. While
there is some debate in the literature as to whether implantation is actually
inhibited, the precautionary principle dictates that all doubts be resolved in
protecting the right to life since the incontrovertible biological fact is that life begins
at conception. See O'BRIAN & SADLER, LANGMAN'S MEDICAL EMBRYOLOGY 117 (2004)
(defining pregnancy as beginning at fertilization of the egg by the sperm).
The question of when rights attach to life is a separate question that is also the
subject of (intense) debate, but it is the position of this author that drawing the line
anywhere other than conception-when tweny-three chromosomes from the sperm
and twenty-three chromosomes from the egg fuse-is arbitrary and leads to a
devaluing of human dignity. Where on the slide down the slippery slope this
devaluation ends is an open issue, but given present trends towards rationing health
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doctrinal guidance on the illicitness of administering such
"emergency contraception" comes from the Pontifical Academy
for Life, which finds that "the proven 'anti-implementation'
action of the morning-after pill is really nothing other than a
chemically-induced abortion" and that "those who ask for or offer
the pill are seeking the direct termination of a possible
pregnancy already in progress, just as in the case of abortion."12 °
Likewise, the pertinent health care directive from the United
States Conference of Catholic Bishops states that "[i]t is not
permissible . . . to initiate or to recommend treatments that
have as their purpose or direct effect the removal, destruction,
or interference with the implantation of a fertilized ovum." 121
Laws in Connecticut,'2 2 Massachusetts, 123 and California, 2 4 to
cite three examples, override conscience rights and require
Catholic hospitals to administer drugs that can cause the
expulsion of a fertilized ovum, that is, a life already in being,
upon request. While the response of the Bishops of Connecticut
has been to capitulate to that state's encroachment on religious
liberty, other bishops have steadfastly maintained that they
would shut down Catholic hospitals before cooperating materially
with intrinsically evil acts. '25
care and a concomitant justification for ending "life not worth living" in the legal
and other literature, things do seem dark. See generally RONALD DWORKIN,
LIFE'S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND INDIVIDUAL
FREEDOM (Vintage Books 1994) (defending abortion and euthanasia on the ground of
respect for individual autonomy); PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 175 (2d ed.
1993) (justifying infanticide); see also DAVID BENATAR, BETER NEVER TO HAVE
BEEN: THE HARM OF COMING INTO EXISTENCE 1 (2006)("[Cloming into existence, far
from ever constituting a net benefit, always s constitutes a net harm. Most people,
under the influence of powerful biological dispositions towards optimism, find this
conclusion intolerable. They are still more indignant at the further implication that
we should not create new people." (emphasis added)).
120 PONTIFICAL ACADEMY FOR LIFE, Statement on the So-called "Morning-After
Pill" VATICAN.VA, Oct. 13, 2000, para. 3, http://www.vatican.va/romancuria/
pontifical-academies/acdlife/documents/rc-pa-acdlife-doc 
-20001031_pillola-giorno-
dopo-en.html (pointing out that pregnancy "begins with fertilization and not with
the implantation of the blastocyst in the uterine wall").
121 UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES Directive no. 36 (4th
ed. 2001), available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/directives.shtml.
122 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-112e(b)(3) (West 2008).
123 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 111, § 70E (West 2009).
124 CAL. PENAL CODE § 13823.11(e) (West 2009).
125 See John-Henry Westen, Wisconsin Bishop Breaks from Conference and
Opposes Emergency Contraception in Catholic Hospitals, LIFESITENEWS.COM, Dec.
19, 2007, http://www.lifesite.com/ldn/2007/dec/07121906.html; John-Henry Westen,
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Another threat is the effort to enshrine a "fundamental"
right to abortion in legislation. Most pronounced is the not-
yet-crystallized Federal "Freedom of Choice Act" ("FOCA"), which
then-candidate Barack Obama said he hoped to sign as his first
act as president. 126
FOCA, however, also has state analogues-mini-FOCA bills
pushed by state legislatures. State courts will need to weigh
deference to legislative decisions against (one would think) a
fundamental right to free exercise contained in respective state
constitutions. In New York for example, the mini-FOCA bill
under consideration has been known as the Reproductive Health
and Privacy Protection Act ("RHAPP")-proposed by former
Governor Eliot Spitzer and seconded by his successor Governor
David Paterson-which would establish a "fundamental right
of privacy"127 encompassing the right to "bear a child or to
terminate a pregnancy."128 RHAPP could be interpreted to
require state licensed or funded hospitals-including Catholic
hospitals-to perform abortions because the state would not be
permitted to provide conscientious protection against the exercise
of abortion rights in the "provision of benefits, facilities, services
or information. "129
At oral argument in Serio-the New York Court of Appeal
contraception mandate case discussed above-questions asked
of the solicitor defending the contraception mandate inquired
as to whether there was a distinction between abortion and
contraception without resolving the issue. 130 It remains an open
question: On the one hand, the court held that access to
contraceptives-which can function as abortifacients, and
Colorado Springs Bishop Says He Does Not and Would Not Permit Plan B in
Catholic Hospitals, LIFESITENEWS.COM, Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.lifesite.com/ldn/
2007/oct07101001.html.
126 See Barack Obama, Speech to Planned Parenthood, July 17, 2007, available
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pfOXIRZSTt8 (video) and http://lauraetch.
googlepages.com/barackobamabeforeplannedparenthoodaction (full transcript).
127 N.Y.S. 6045-A, 230th Sess. (2007). It will likely be reintroduced in this
session under the name "Reproductive Health Act."
128 Id.
129 See id.
130 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9-10, Catholic Charities of the Diocese of
Albany v. Serio, 7 N.Y.3d 510, 859 N.E.2d 459, 825 N.Y.S.2d 653 (2006) cert. denied
sub nom. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Dinallo, 128 S. Ct. 97 (2007)
(No. 2006-0110) (noting the questions asked by Judge Graffeo and Judge Smith of
Shaifali Puri).
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therefore, burden religious believers and Catholic institutions-if
mandated by the legislature, overrode free exercise rights. 3 1 On
the other hand, it also set up certain firewalls, as seen above in
the context of the seal of the confessional.'32 How far those walls
will extend remains to be seen, and in the post-Smith world,
would be determined by state court interpretations of state free
exercise clauses and doctrines.133
B. Free Exercise and Traditional Marriage
What is marriage? What is its purpose?
Marriage is a pre-political institution, by its nature premised
"upon the biological complimentarity of the sexes, ordered to
natural birthing and raising of children, for the flourishing of
individuals and society as a whole." 34 John Locke described it as
a voluntary Compact between Man and Woman: and tho' it
consist chiefly in such a Communion and Right in one anothers
Bodies, as is necessary to its chief End, Procreation; yet it draws
131 See Serio, 7 N.Y.3d at 525, 859 N.E.2d at 466, 825 N.Y.S.2d at 660.
132 Id. (adopting a test that is "more protective of religious exercise than the rule
of Smith").
133 Beyond the constitutional arguments, if the New York legislature were to
pass some form of the RHAPP legislation, statutory protection of the conscience
rights of physicians and health care workers would also come to the fore, though
these would not necessarily protect Catholic hospitals. Federal law provides that the
receipt of certain federal funding "does not authorize any court or any public official
or other public authority to require" an individual or entity to perform sterilization
procedures or abortions if it would be against an individual's "religious beliefs or
moral convictions." 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(b) (2006). Certain covered employers are
prohibited from discriminating against employees or applicants who conscientiously
object to participation in abortions or sterilizations. See id. § 300a-7(c)(1); see also
id. § 300a-7(e). Section 238 of the Federal Public Health Service Act provides,
[tihe Federal Government, and any State or local government that receives
Federal financial assistance, may not subject any health care entity to
discrimination on the--(1) basis that the entity refuses to undergo training
in the performance of induced abortions, to require or provide such
training, to perform such abortions, or to provide referrals for such training
or such abortions.
Id. § 238n(a)(1). The statute defines "health care entity" as "an individual physician,
a postgraduate physician training program, and a participant in a program of
training in the health professions." Id. § 238n(c)(2) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Accordingly, Catholic physicians, but not necessarily hospitals, faced with
adverse state administrative action may be able invoke section 238 of the Federal
Public Health Service Act which, under the Supremacy Clause, should trump the
application of RHAPP.
"' See Piero A. Tozzi, The Blessing or the Curse: Whose Values Will Guide Us?
Where Will They Lead Us?, 47 J. CATHOLIC LEGAL STUD. 167, 183 n.55 (2008).
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with it mutual Support, and Assistance, and a Communion of
Interest too, as necessary not only to unite their Care, and
Affection, but also necessary to their common Off-spring, who
have a Right to be nourished and maintained by them, till they
are able to provide for themselves.
35
By its nature, marriage is a union between man and woman,
which society sanctions for the benefit not as much for the man
and woman, but (a) for the children that inevitably result when a
man and a woman congress, and (b) for society as a whole,
since such children must be cared for, reared, and essentially
tamed' 3 6-that is to say, integrated into society as well-adjusted
individuals. What was once proclaimed by the Supreme Court as
a truism-" [m] arriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race"-now seems to be an
observation that has escaped many.137
As a common understanding of marriage and its purposes
continues to erode, proponents of marriage as the union of one
man and one woman-an understanding which may derive from
religious conviction, though it is manifest universally across
cultures and not a religious belief per se-comes under hostile
assault from certain social segments. This was certainly evident
in the debate in California over Proposition 8, where religious
supporters of traditional marriage, in particular, Mormons, were
subject to rank anti-religious bigotry. 138  Indeed, according to
some homosexual activists, advocates for traditional marriage
should be "fined, fired and even jailed until they relent"' 39-that
is to say, until they surrender their religious convictions.
One obvious area in which free exercise-individuals or
religiously affiliated institutions acting in the public square in
accordance with religious principles-has been threatened is
adoption. When governments require adoption agencies to
adhere to a policy of "non-discrimination" between same-sex and
traditional households with respect to the placement of children,
135 JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 319 (Peter Laslett ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
136 As the American novelist Hervey Allen wrote, "[elach new generation is a
fresh invasion of savages." HERVEY ALLEN, ANTHONY ADVERSE (1933).
137 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
138 See Jessica Garrison & Joanna Lin, Prop. 8 Protestors Target Mormon
Temple in Westwood, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2008, at B1.
139 David Benkof, Why California Gays Shouldn't Celebrate State Court Ruling,
SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May 21, 2008, at B7.
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as seen in Massachusetts in the wake of that state's "gay
marriage" decision, 14 religious institutions are forced to either
acquiesce or withdraw from the public square. There, rather
than bowing to state dictates and violating Church teaching,
Catholic Charities of Boston ceased participating in all
adoptions. 1 4  Less than a year after the charity's decision, the
Archdiocese of San Francisco was forced to follow suit. 42  In
both cases, the Church agency could not violate Catholic
teaching that, "[t]he bond between two men or two women cannot
constitute a real family and much less can the right be
attributed to that union to adopt children.' 43  Adoption
by same-sex couples is deemed to be "gravely damaging to the
rights of children," as it involves "serious, negative and even
irreparable consequences for the normal development of their
personalities.' 44 Catholic adoption agencies were thus forced to
retreat from the public square. How exactly does this "victory"
140 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
141 See Father Robert J. Carr, Boston's Catholic Charities To Stop Adoption
Service over Same-Sex Law, Mar. 10, 2006, CATHOLIC ONLINE, http://www.catholic.
org/national/national-story.php?id=19017.
142 Patricia Wen, Calif. Charity Ends Full Adoptions, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 3,
2006, at B2.
143 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR THE FAMILY, FAMILY, MARRIAGE AND "DE FACTO"
UNIONS 29 (U.S. Catholic Conference 2001) (quoting John Paul II, ANGELUS (Feb.
20, 1994)).
144 Final Declaration of the International Symposium on Adoption, "The Rights
of Children," 13-14. In placing children with same-sex couples, one question that
needs to be asked is which parent is deemed unnecessary for raising healthy
children-the mother or the father? Advocates of same-sex adoption tend to focus on
"rights" of the adults in question rather than the rights of the children. See David
Quinn, Daddy Must Go--He's Not Politically Correct, IRISH INDEP. (Dublin), May 23,
2008 ("[W]e have convinced ourselves that recognising the right of single women or
lesbian couples to fertility services has no consequences beyond the happiness of the
adults involved. We have forgotten that a child has a right to a father and a father
has a right to his child.").
For studies of the effects upon children of being reared in such same-sex households,
see Paul Cameron & Kirk Cameron, Homosexual Parents, 31 ADOLESCENCE
757 (1996), available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mim2248/isn124_v31/ai_
19226135/?tag=content;coll; George Reckers & Mark Kilgus, Review of Research on
Homosexual Parenting, Adoption and Foster Parenting, http://www.narth.com/
docs/RationaleBasisFinal0405.pdf; George Reckers & Mark Kilgus, Studies of
Homosexual Parenting: A Critical Review, 14 REGENT UNIV. L. REV. 343 (2002)
(analyzing the literature on adoption of children by same-sex couples and noting
methodological shortcomings of certain studies); see also Don Browning & Elizabeth
Marquardt, What About the Children? Liberal Cautions on Same-Sex Marriage, in
THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE: FAMILY, STATE, MARKET, AND MORALS (Robert P.
George & Jean Bethke Elshtain eds., 2006).
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for liberal state aggrandizement and special interest activists
benefit children in need of adoption services?
Another area in which declining free exercise protection, plus
the rise of SSM, augurs trouble for religious believers, is the area
of public accommodation laws. Examples abound. In New
Jersey, the Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association, a Methodist
organization, is under investigation by the State Department of
Law and Public Safety Division on Civil Rights because a group
of lesbians filed a complaint after the organization refused to
rent a boardwalk pavilion to them.145  The investigation
continues, in part, because "the transaction in question is
governed by the [Law Against Discrimination]'s provisions for
places of public accommodation." 146 Although the government is
continuing its investigation of the organization, the state has
already revoked tax-exempt status on the pavilion.'47 According
to Lisa Jackson-then the New Jersey Commissioner of
Environmental Protection, now the Obama administration's pick
to head the Federal Environmental Protection Agency-the
status was revoked because "the pavilion is not open to all
persons on an equal basis."'4 The fact that Ocean Grove was
motivated by religious beliefs never factored into the revocation
of the tax-exempt status and was rejected by the Division on
Civil Rights.149
In a similar case, Vermont innkeepers have been taken to
their state's human rights commission for being merely reticent
about hosting a civil union reception. 5 °
In New Mexico, a photographer and her company have been
taken before the state human rights commission for declining to
145 Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break over Gay Union Issue, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 18, 2007, at B2.
146 Letter from J. Frank Vespa-Papaleo, Esq., Dir., State of N.J., Office
of the Attorney Gen., Dep't of Law and Pub. Safety, Div. on Civil Rights to Counsel
for Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Association (Jan. 7, 2008), available at http:l/
media.npr.org/documents/2008/jun/pavilion.pdf.
... Capuzzo, supra note 145.
148 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). On her new federal position, see Lisa
P. Jackson, Times Topics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2009, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/people/j/lisa-pjackson/index.htm?8qa&scp=-spot&sq=Lisa+
P.+Jackson&st=nyt.
149 Vespa-Papaleo, supra note 146, at 3.
150 See Lindsey Douthit, Vermont Inn Sued for Resisting Same-Sex Civil Union
Ceremony, Concerned Women for America, July 24, 2005, http://www.cwfa.
org/articledisplay.asp?id=8607&department=CFI&categoryid=family.
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photograph a same-sex "commitment ceremony."1"1 The case
arose when two lesbians e-mailed Elane Photography, LLC about
the project through the company's website. 152 They filed suit for
discrimination 5 3 upon being refused services on the grounds that
photographing such a project was against the company owners'
and employees' Christian beliefs.'54 The case is pending appeal,
but the Human Rights Commission administrative decision
leveled a $6,637.94 award1 5 on the grounds that the company
was a public accommodation 156 and must obey laws prohibiting
public accommodations from refusing to serve people on the basis
of sexual orientation. 157 In response to the free exercise claims,
the Commission wrote that the facts of the case failed to support
an exception to the non-discrimination law on those grounds, 15
but the Commission ultimately ducked the question by declaring
that "questions as to an automatic preemption.., by the United
States Constitution, the New Mexico Constitution or the New
Mexico Religious Freedom Restoration Act... are not before" the
commission.1 59
CONCLUSION
This is just a brief survey of some of the fronts where the
rights to free exercise of religious belief and of conscience are
under attack. Even if the sample is small and non-exhaustive, it
suffices to show just how invidious a weak free exercise doctrine
can be. 160 After the United States Supreme Court adopted the
151 Willock v. Elane Photography, LLC, HRD No. 06-12-20-0685 at 1 (Human
Rights Comm'n of the State of N.M. Apr. 9, 2008), available at http://volokh.com/
files/willockopinion.pdf.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 8.
1 Id. at 6.
155 Id. at 19.
156 Id. at 16.
157 Id. at 18.
158 Id. at 14.
"I Id. at 18. I have written elsewhere about a case I litigated in which similar
issues were raised in connection with a subpoena issued by then New York Attorney
General Eliot Spitzer on a Long Island business. Following a motion to quash, the
subpoena was withdrawn. See Tozzi, supra note 92, at 169-70.
160 Other examples include a fertility clinic sued by lesbians for refusing to
artificially inseminate them; the Supreme Court of California has not yet handed
down a ruling in this case, but in oral arguments the court showed "little interest in
[the] argument that freedom of religion as guaranteed by the state and Federal
Constitutions should have been the focus." Mike McKee, Calif Justices Appear To
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Smith test, state free exercise clauses have become increasingly
important. With this increased importance comes the need to
interpret them as providing broad protection, allowing religious
citizens the ability to participate in the public square in a
manner consistent with their beliefs.
Given the increasingly intolerant landscape, failure to
reinvigorate free exercise jurisprudence and accommodate
religiously motivated conduct and conscientious objection-
or even non-religiously-motivated conscientious acts and
omissions-will lead to more state coercion of those citizens who
dissent because they labor to preserve what George Washington
called "that little spark of celestial fire called conscience. '"161
Favor Lesbian in Dispute over Artificial Insemination, LAW.COM, May 29, 2008,
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202421761840.
161 GEORGE WASHINGTON, RULES OF CIVILITY & DECENT BEHAVIOUR IN
COMPANY AND CONVERSATION: A BOOK OF ETIQUETTE 62 (AKASHIc BOOKS 2004)
(1926).
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